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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Even so, there will be no loss to statecraft if in the daily activities of
courts the needs of practical judicial administration may have some
sway to persuade against compelling two lawsuits where one will more
completely serve the interests of the litigants."88
ERNEST W. MACHEN, JR.
Mortgages-Foreclosures-Partial Sale of Land
A executed a deed of trust on four tracts of land to T to secure the
payment of a series of notes payable to C and maturing in 1925. In
1926, T advertised under the power of sale of the deed and sold one of
the tracts of land included therein. In 1928, T advertised and sold two
additional tracts of land. The latter tracts were bought in by C, who
went into possession, but no deed was given him for the land until 1943,
some 18 years after the maturity of the debt. Under the law then
existing, unless a mortgagee was in possession, the foreclosure sale and
the execution and delivery of the deed pursuant thereto, in order to be
valid, must have been completed within 10 years from the date the debt
matured. In a suit by the heirs of A against the heirs of C to quiet
title to the land, the issue became one of whether or not C was a mort-
gagee in possession of the two tracts to which he had no deed. Held:
For the heirs of A. It is a general rule that there can be only one f ore-
closure of a mortgage or deed of trust. When a mortgagee or a trustee
under a deed of trust elects to sell only a portion of the pledged property
to satisfy the debt, the remainder of the security is released, and he can-
not thereafter assert any right to it. Therefore, C was not and could not
have been a mortgagee in possession after the execution and delivery of
the deed made pursuant to the foreclosure sale held in 1926.1
The rule against successive foreclosures of the mortgage security has
been widely applied where a decree is sought in a court of equity, 2 on
the theory that a mortgage represents but a single security and therefore
but a single cause of action, which cannot be split. Therefore, the fore-
closure cannot be piecemeal. The basic idea of not splitting the mort-
gagee's cause of action has, in several states, been enacted into statutes
which set out that "there shall be but one single action for the enforce-
"' Judge Clark, dissenting in Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. 2d 16, 20
(C. C. A. 2d 1939).
1 Layden v. Layden, 228 N. C. 5, 44 S. E. 2d 340 (1947).2 Dumont v. Taylor, 67 Kan. 727, 74 Pac. 234 (1903) (mortagee got one decree
and order of sale, but withdrew it; second foreclosure refused) ; Hanson v. Dunton
35 Minn. 189, 28 N. W. 221 (1886) (mortagee had foreclosed once for part of
the debt, sought a second foreclosure for the remainder) ; Long v. W. P. Devereux
Co., 87 Mont. 209, 286 Pac. 406 (1930) (no second foreclosure on wheat grown
on mortgaged land, where mortgagee had failed to assert his right to the wheat
in the first foreclosure by having a receiver appointed) ; Nebraska .oan and Trust
Co. v. Damon, 4 Neb. (unof.) 334, 93 N. W. 1022 (1903) (foreclosure of mortgage
for interest only, where whole debt is due, exhausts lien) ; Dooly v. Eastman, 28
Wash. 564, 68 Pac. 1039 (1902).
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ment of any right secured by a mortgage."3  Indeed, the problem of
successive foreclosures is but one of many which the "one single action"
theory raises.
4
To say, absolutely, that a mortgagee may foreclose but one time in
any situation would be a harsh rule, and strictly applied, a trap for many
an unwary mortgagee. As a result, courts of, equity, in their decrees,
have made several provisions for his benefit. As might be suspected,
where it is a procedural impossibility to foreclose in one suit, a second
suit is not barred.5 Likewise, where, inadvertently, all parties having
an interest in the property are not joined the first time, a second forer
closure may be had on the interest of the omitted party.6
The rest of the cases fall into two general groups-(1) where the
debt has matured only in part and (2) where the debt has matured in
whole. The first concerns the situation which arises where the mort-
gage secures a debt which falls due in successive installments, and the
mortgage contains no acceleration clause. If a foreclosure decree is had
for a part of the debt due (i.e., upon default of an installment where
other installments have yet to mature), the property is discharged from
the lien of the mortgage, and the mortgagee cannot foreclose again when
the subsequent installments are not paid 7 To save this situation, equity
courts will treat as incorporated into the decree a provision for the pres-
ervation of the lien, enabling the mortgagee to sell later under the same
decree other parcels of land to satisfy subsequent installments.8  Or, if
the property is not readily divisible, the whole may be sold, and the
court will direct that the sale be subject to a lien for the unmatured
portion of the debt ;" or, will direct that the whole security be sold, and
after the due portion of the debt is paid, that the surplus be applied to
the unmatured installments; or, will direct that the surplus be invested
until such installments become due.' 0 Accordingly, though there is a
'CALIF. CODE CIV. PRoC. (Deering, 1941) §726; IDAHO LAWS ANN. (1943)
§9-101; MONT. REv. CODES (Anderson and McFarlane, 1935) §9567; NEv. ComP.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §9048; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §104-55.1.
'1 GLENN, MORTGAGES §96 (1st ed. 1943).
'Widman v. Hammack, 110 Wash. 77, 187 Pac. 1091 (1920) (land in two dif-
ferent states).
' Brackett v. Barnegas, 116 Cal. 278, 48 Pac. 90 (1897) (mortgage foreclosed
without making wife a party where homestead had been previously declared);
Chrystal River Lumber Co. v. Knight Turpentine Co., 69 Fla. 288, 67 So. 974
(1915) (holders of contract rights to timber on land not made parties) ; McCague
v. Eller, 77 Neb. 531, 110 N. W. 318 (1906) (equity of redemption left in part of
the premises in heirs at law of mortgagor).
Curtis v. Cutler, 76 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 8th 1896); Cadd v. Snell, 219 Iowa
728, 259 N. W. 590 (1935).
'Black v. Reno, 59 Fed. 917 (C. C. Mo. 1894).
' Light v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 177 Ark. 846, 7 S. W. 2d 975
(1928) ; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Prendergast, 335 Ill. 646, 167 N. E. 769
(1929).
"See Black v. Reno, 59 Fed. 917 (C. C. Mo. 1894).
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rule against partial foreclosure, proper steps in equity may preserve the
lien of the mortgage."
In several states these principles have been incorporated into statutes
which are expressly designed to save the mortgage lien from extinction
when foreclosure is made on one installment of an obligation. 12
Where the whole debt is due, there are no piecemeal foreclosure
provisions in favor of the mortgagee, unless there exists some special
equity in his favor.13 He has his opportunity then and there to realize
on all of his security. If he forecloses on only a portion of a divisible
security for the whole of the debt, then the partial foreclosure rule bars
him from a second action.14
In the subject case, the court found no reason why the rule should
not be applied to a power of sale in a deed of trust. The .extension
seems a legally logical one. Foreclosure by decree in equity and by
advertisement under a power of sale, though different in method, are
similar in principle. The mortgage still represents a single security which
should not be foreclosed piecemeal, whether the foreclosure be inside
the court or out. Moreover, one purpose of the rule is to prevent the
harassment of the debtor by continued sales, and a power of sale,. not
being exercised under the guidance of the court, is more capable of
being so used.
In other states where the power of sale is frequently used, the ap-
plication of the rule has been recognized, 15 and statutes have been passed
to protect the lien of the mortgage where the debt matures in install-
ments.
16
North Carolina has no statute protecting any piecemeal foreclosure. 17
112 WILTsiE, MORTGAGE FOREcLosuRE §832 (5th ed. Fribourg, Elting and Fri-
bourg, 1939).
" ARiz CODE (1939) §21-1226; IDAHO LAWS ANN. (1943) §9-103; MICH. STAT.
ANN. (Henderson, 1935) §27-1145 through 1148; MINN. STAT. (Henderson, 1941)
§580.09; MONT. REv. CODES (Anderson and McFarlane, 1935) §9469; NEv. ComP.
LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §9050; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) §2:65046 through 65058;
N. D. REv. CODE (1943) §32-1915; N. Y. CIv. PRAC. Acr §1086; S. D. CODE (1939)
§37:2909; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §104-55-5; WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Rem-
ington, 1931) §1127; Wisc. STAT. (Brossard, 1943) §278:06.
13 Gerig v. Loveland, 130 Cal. 512, 62 Pac. 830 (1900) ; Berrie, Sheriff v. Smith,
97 Ga. 782, 25 S. E. 757 (1896) ; Swift and Co. v. First National Bank of Barnes-
yille, 161 Ga. 547, 132'S. E. 99 (1926) ; Herzog v. Union Debenture Co., 94 Neb.
820, 144 N. W. 814 (1913)." Long v. W. P. Devereux Co., 87 Mont. 209, 286 Pac. 406 (1930).
"Walton v. Hollywood, 47 Mich. 385, 11 N. W. 209 (1882) (no second fore-
closure for taxes and insurance premiums paid subsequent to foreclosure under
power of sale).1 MIcH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1935) §27. 1222, applied in Bridgman v.
Johnson, 44 Mich. 491, 7 N. W. 83 (1880); MINN. STAT. (Henderson, 1941)
§580.09; N. D. REv. CODE (1943) §35-2205; S. D. CODE (1939) §37:3003; Wisc.
STAT. (Brossard, 1943) § 297:03 (if the mortgage be payable by installments,
each installment after the first is deemed to be secured by a separate mortgage
and foreclosure may be had for each installment as if a separate mortgage had
been given for each).
1 But see in this connection N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §45-27 (sale of land
where land consists of two separate tracts lying wholly in different counties).
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This creates a problem from the standpoint of both the debtor and the
creditor where the land is divisible into parcels and foreclosure is made
under a power of sale. The mortgagee, when only part, of his debt is
matured, must sell the whole security subject to a lien for the remainder
of the debt. There is no equitable decree to provide for saving the lien,
so that he may sell in parcels as the debt matures. Moreover, when he
sells, whether only part or all of the debt is due, he must be sure that
he sells enough of the land to make him whole. He has no. second op-
portunity to foreclose if the first foreclosure does not provide enough.
From the viewpoint of the mortgagor, the rule designated to aid
him becomes a detriment where he has pledged land grossly in excess
of the amount of his debt. The mortgagee will sell all of the security,.or
at least substantially more than is necessary, in order to protect himself,
regardless of whether the mortgagor would rather have the surplus
land-than the surplus from the proceeds of the sale.
For those who want to avoid the problem so raised, the, simplest
method seems a provision in the mortgage contract providing for a
continuing power of sale authorizing the mortgagee to sell the mortgaged
property in parcels from time to time until the whole debt is satisfied;
but directing that only so much, of the property be sold as is necessary
to satisfy the debt then due. The court, in the instant case, indicated
the propriety of such a clause.' 8
As has been pointed out, many states protect the lien of the mortgage
where the debt matures in installments. Alabama, evidently feeling that
the rule against partial foreclosure should not apply to the sale of land
in parcels whether the debt had matured in part or in whole, has made
such a clause statutory. The statute sets out that foreclosure, either by
power of sale or in equity, shall operate as foreclosure only as to the
property sold, and provides that every power of sale contained in a
mortgage shall be a continuing power of sale unless it is expressly pro-
vided otherwise. 19
The need for such a statute in North Carolina must be determined
by a balancing of the respective interests of the mortgagor and the mort-
gagee. Since the rule against partial foreclosure may operate to the
detriment of the mortgagor where the land is divisible, and is a detri-
18Layden v. Layden, 228 N. C. 5, 8, 44 S. E. 2d 340, 342 (1947).
19 ALA. CoDE (1940) tit. 47, §169: "The sale of any part of the property con-
veyed by mortgage, either under power of sale contained in the mortgage or by
foreclosure in a court of equity, shall operate as a foreclosure of the mortgage
only as to the property sold, and if the mortgage indebtedness is not thereby
settled in full, the other property contained in the mortgage continues as security
for the mortgage debt and there may be a further foreclosure of the mortgage,
either by sale under power of sale or in equity. Every power of sale contained in
the mortgages hereafter executed shall, unless otherwise expressly provided therein,
be held to give a continuing power of sale authorizing the mortgagee or his assignee
after the law day of the mortgage to sell the mortgaged property from time to
time in separate lots or parcels as it comes into his possession."
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ment in any event to the mortgagee, it is submitted that a statute in the
nature of the one in Alabama would best serve the interests of both. It
should include, in addition, a clause providing that only so much property
should be sold as is necessary to satisfy the debt then due. Under such
a statute partial foreclosure would then operate to cut off the lien of
the mortgage in one case: that is, where only a portion of the debt had
matured and the-mortgagee foreclosed on the whole property without
preserving the lien.
LEImUEL H. GiBBONS
Workmen's Compensation-Falls Due to Dizzinessf Vertigo,
Epilepsy and Like Causes
It was recently held by the Georgia Court of Appeals that a fractured
skull sustained by a department store salesman, when he suffered an
epileptic attack and fell against a sharp cornered table, was an accident
arising out o.f the employment. The State Board of Workmen's Com-
pensation granted the award on a finding that the exertion of the work
brought on the attack.1 Without rejecting the finding of the Board, the
Court rather ambitiously advanced an entirely different theory. It was
said that irrespective of whether the exertion taused the attack, the in-
jury was compensable, since the table which claimant struck constituted
a "special hazard" of the employment.2 That anything so common-
place as a table should be denominated a "special hazard" and made the
basis of liability for an injury may shock those employers who are not
aware of some of the recent trends in workmen's compensation.
The Georgia statutes8 do not make the employer liable for every
accident which happens while the worker is on the job, but require the
employment in some manner contribute to the injury. In theory, at
1 The finding of exertion was not based on any immediate act, instead the whole
nature of the employment was examined, which included climbing stairs and stand-
ing for a ten-hour work day.
Note that North Carolina apparently requires some particular act of exertion
beyond the usual requirements of the employment. Neely v. Statesville, 212 N. C.
365, 193 S. E. 664 (1937) ; Moore v. Engineering & Sales Co., 214 N. C. 424, 199
S. E. 605 (1938) ; For annotations of N. C. Industrial Comnmission decisions, see
N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1946) p. 25-26. But see Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing
Co., 227 N. C. 184, 187, 41 S. E. 2d 592, 594 (1947) (concurring opinion).
'United States Casualty Co. v. Richardson, - Ga. App. -, 43 S. E. 2d 793
(1947). Compare language of same court twelve years before where workman
fainted and fell at water fountain. The decision was found not to be in "conflict
with the main case. "The better and more generally followed rule would seem to
be that followed by Judge Stanley of the Department of Industrial Relations, to
the effect that an injury arising from a physical seizure not induced by or related
to the employment is not such an accident as would afford compensation, even
though it might appear that the particular consequences of the seizure were such
as would not have resulted elsewhere than at the place of the employment." Bibb
Mfg. Co. v. Alford, 51 Ga. App. 277, 179 S. E. 912, 914 (1935).
' GA. CODE ANN. (Park, 1937) §114-102 (1935). "'Injury' and 'personal in-
jury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment...."
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